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Abstract
New enforcement strategies allow agents to gain the regulator’s trust and consequently
face a lower audit probability. Prior research suggests that, in order to prevent lower compli-
ance, a reduction in the audit probability (the “carrot”) must be compensated with the intro-
duction of a higher penalty for non-compliance (the “stick”). However, such carrot-and-stick
strategies reflect neither the concept of trust nor the strategies observed in practice. In re-
sponse to this, we define trust-based regulation as a strategy that incorporates rules that
allow trust to develop, and using a generic (non-cooperative) game of tax compliance, we
examine whether trust-based regulation is feasible (i.e., whether, in equilibrium, a reduction
in the audit probability, without ever increasing the penalty for non-compliance, does not
lead to reduced compliance). The model shows that trust-based regulation is feasible when
the agent sufficiently values the future. In line with the concept of trust, this strategy is feasi-
ble when the regulator is uncertain about the agent’s intentions. Moreover, the model
shows that (i) introducing higher penalties makes trust-based regulation less feasible, and
(ii) combining trust and forgiveness can lead to a lower audit probability for both trusted and
distrusted agents. Policy recommendations often point toward increasing deterrence. This
model shows that the opposite can be optimal.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine whether it is feasible to incorporate trust into an enforcement strate-
gy. Our motivation is based on the following two observations. First, across diverse countries
and regulatory settings, new enforcement strategies explicitly incorporate the concept of trust.
In this context, trust is indicated by a reduction in the audit probability so that, as compared to
other agents, trusted agents are audited less frequently. Second, prior research suggests that in-
troducing a lower audit probability is indeed a feasible enforcement strategy [1–4], but only
when agents face a relatively harsher punishment for not complying, which contradicts the
concept trust [5].
Hence, the key question for both researchers and policy-makers is whether a strategy that
reflects trust will inevitably lead to reduced compliance. In response to this, we define trust-
based regulation as a strategy that incorporates rules that allow trust to develop (i.e., rules that
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determine how the audit probability can be reduced without ever increasing the penalty for not
complying). Then, using a generic repeated game theoretical model of tax compliance, we ex-
amine whether trust-based regulation is a feasible strategy for the regulator (i.e., whether, in
equilibrium, a lower audit probability does not lead to reduced compliance).
References to trust in regulatory practice
In the area of tax regulation, at least 24 countries have recently established “trust-based rela-
tionships” between large corporate taxpayers and tax revenue bodies [6]. Similarly, the United
Kingdom and the European Union explicitly incorporate trust into environmental regulations
by promoting openness and cooperation between firms and supervisory authorities [4]. Re-
cently, the Dutch Customs implemented a certification system in which auditing levels are
based on the extent to which firms are trusted [7]. According to the Danish Code for Good
Business Regulations, “businesses which comply with law should be rewarded with less super-
vision” [8]. For instance, firms in the food industry that pass four consecutive inspections will
be subject to fewer inspections.
Prior research on the reduction of the audit probability
Becker’s [9] economic model of criminal behavior shows that compliance increases with the
penalty and the audit probability. The rationale is that more auditing and higher penalties in-
crease the expected costs associated with not complying, and thus act as economic deterrents of
non-compliance. Moreover, there exists an inverse relationship between audit probability and
penalty, so that a reduction in one “compensates” an increase in the other. Through this “com-
pensation”mechanism, the overall level of deterrence (i.e., the net expected costs associated
with non-compliance) can be maintained.
The inverse relationship between audit probability and penalty is found in Becker’s model
[9], as well as other classic one-period games of regulatory compliance [10–12]. This rationale
applies to repeated games if we interpret these 1-period games as subgames in an infinitely re-
peated game (in this paper, we call this the “game without trust”). In such case, the solution of
the 1-period game is equivalent to the solution of the repeated game. But even though repeated
interactions may affect the players’ strategies (see, e.g., [13]), the same “compensation” logic is
observed in multi-period games in which the agent’s expected costs depend on (i) the probabil-
ity of detection, and (ii) any loss associated with getting caught not complying (imposed by the
regulator). This can be seen, for example, in the repeated games of Greenberg and Harrington
[1, 2]. The key point is that a lower audit probability leads to reduced compliance, ceteris
paribus.
Models of conditional audit probabilities are particularly relevant in this context, as they
have multiple periods and specifically examine the relationship between compliance and vary-
ing audit probabilities. In these models, the regulator uses the outcome of a current audit in
order to determine an agent’s future audit probability [14]. Compliance can be rewarded with
of a lower audit probability (the “carrot”), whereas non-compliance can be punished with a
higher audit probability or penalty for non-compliance (the “stick”) [3]. In general, the “stick”
refers to any action the regulator takes in order to increase the expected costs associated with
non-compliance. In Greenberg’s model [1], the stick consists in entering an absorbing state
with an audit probability equal to 1, while in Harrington’s model [2] the stick consists in enter-
ing a state with a higher audit probability and penalty for non-compliance. Subsequent refine-
ments of these models incorporate this type of stick [3, 15]. The basic idea in these models is
that the carrot needs to be “compensated” with a stick or else compliance decreases.
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Conceptual work on reducing the audit probability builds on the same logic. According to a
literature review on the topic, the introduction of a lower audit probability requires placing
trust “in the foreground” and “distrust in the background” [16], i.e., the regulator’s response to
trust violations should be incremental, and involve harsher penalties or “more punitive en-
forcement” [4]. For instance, the punishment of trust violations should be more severe as tax
authorities increase their trust towards taxpayers [17].
Trust-based regulation
A commonly applied definition of trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability based on posi-
tive expectations about the other’s behavior [5]. In line with this definition, trust has three ad-
ditional characteristics. First, trust is a unidirectional construct, which means that it goes from
a given trustor to a given trustee [18] (because this paper focuses on enforcement strategies, we
only examine the regulator’s trust towards the agent, and ignore the agent’s trust towards the
regulator). Second, trust can emerge as the relationship develops, which means that trust can
be built, maintained, and dissolved [5, 19–21]. Third, trust involves risk as it makes the trustor
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior. This implies that trust involves at least some level of un-
certainty about the other’s actions [5].
In a regulatory context, a lower audit probability increases the expected benefits associated
with not complying [9], and thus makes the regulator more vulnerable to non-compliance.
Therefore, trust in this context can be defined as the regulator’s willingness to reduce the audit
probability based on positive expectations about compliance. More specifically, trust is based
upon the expectation that the agent will not comply less when the audit probability is lower.
Note that introducing the stick of a higher penalty is not indicative of the regulator’s trust.
This stick deters the agent from not complying, and thus reduces the regulator’s vulnerability
towards the agent. Moreover, this stick responds to negative rather than positive expectations
about compliance. By increasing the penalty, the regulator expects the agent to take advantage
of the lower audit probability and comply to a lesser extent. Hence, the stick reflects distrust
rather than trust [5].
In sum, it can be said that reducing the audit probability while simultaneously increasing
deterrence is “not trust at all” [5]. By definition, a strategy that incorporates trust cannot rely
on making the punishment more severe. With this in mind, trust-based regulation can be de-
fined as an enforcement strategy that incorporates rules that allow trust to develop, based on
the introduction of the carrot of a lower audit probability, but never the stick of a higher penal-
ty for not complying. This definition has the advantage of reflecting strategies that are currently
applied in practice, and goes in line with the above-mentioned conceptualization of trust.
Game overview
Our departure point is a generic model of tax compliance, which is repeated throughout an in-
finite time horizon (we refer to it as the “game without trust”). We present two rules that de-
scribe how trust is established, and then compare the game with and without these rules. As
trust is more appropriately examined in settings that allow for opportunism, the model is a
non-cooperative game in which players maximize their payoffs in an entirely selfish manner
(we do not incorporate other-regarding preferences or reciprocity).
The generic model resembles the standard tax compliance model presented by Andreoni
and colleagues [11]. Like influential models of tax compliance [22, 23], the generic model is
based on economic deterrence, so that a lower audit probability reduces the incentives to com-
ply, ceteris paribus. Focusing on a generic model of tax compliance allows us to directly analyze
the consequences of trust-based regulation, while avoiding any confusion that may arise from
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incorporating additional extensions. Extensions to the generic model include, but are not re-
stricted to, connections to the labor market, firm production, and social interaction among het-
erogeneous taxpayers [24]; information acquisition [25]; different orders of risk aversion [26];
and agency costs in corporate tax compliance [27]. For overviews of these and other extensions,
see [11, 24, 28].
Moreover, the generic model captures the idea that (i) regulation involves repeated interac-
tions between the agent and the regulator, (ii) compliance is costly for the agent, and (iii) audit-
ing is costly for both the agent and the regulator. In this sense, the intuition of the game may
apply to other regulatory settings with similar characteristics.
The generic model (i.e., the “game without trust”) represents the status quo; a setting in
which trust cannot develop, and the regulator applies a standard “deterrence-based” approach.
The penalty is the same in the games with and without trust. In the game with trust, however,
the audit probability can be reduced. The implication is that trust can only benefit—and will
never harm—the agent. The worst-case scenario for the agent is the status quo (i.e., a setting in
which trust is not built or dissolves), and for this reason, incorporating the rules that allow
trust to develop reflects a positive disposition towards the agent, which is a central aspect of
trust [5].
The model shows that trust-based regulation is a feasible equilibrium strategy when the
agent sufficiently values the future. If the agent’s time horizon is long, rewarding observed
compliance with the carrot of a lower audit probability does not lead to reduced compliance in
subsequent periods. This equilibrium is Pareto efficient as it never harms the regulator and re-
duces the agent’s costs of being audited.
However, if the agent’s time horizon is short, trust is misused, and therefore trust-based reg-
ulation is not an equilibrium strategy. Additionally, we show that trust-based regulation is fea-
sible when (i) the regulator is uncertain about the agent’s intentions, and (ii) trust violations
can be forgiven.
The Folk Theorem or grim strategies indicate that, for certain types of rules, these kind of
equilibria exist [13, 29]. We confine our attention to the specific rules that are currently applied
in practice and are indicative of the regulator’s trust towards the agent (i.e., a set of rules in
which observed compliance leads to a lower audit probability without ever increasing penalties
or audit probabilities). Of course, higher compliance can be achieved, for example, by increas-
ing the penalties (as grim strategies suggest), but our objective is not to find the rules that lead
to optimal compliance. Instead, we are interested in examining whether currently applied rules
do not lead to trust violations.
Additionally, we confine our attention to the strategic agent, which may represent a firm or
an individual and complies as long as it is profitable to do so. We do not analyze the honest
agent, who complies regardless of the incentive to cheat [30]. This is because the main ques-
tions and risks faced in practice relate to opportunistic behavior. Nevertheless, in the Section
Equilibrium strategies we briefly discuss how honesty makes trust-based regulation more bene-
ficial for both players.
Trust and reputation
Trust and reputation are different, yet closely related concepts [31]. In this subsection, we dis-
cuss the relation between these two concepts, and explain why the strategies applied in practice
and modeled in our game resemble more a “trust-based” than a “reputation-based” strategy.
In game theory, reputation can be defined as the inference of a player’s private information
based on past observed behavior [32]. Past behavior may refer to actions taken in an indepen-
dent market [33], or more generally, in the same game but with other players [34, 35]. Once
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established, reputation may lead to what economists call “reputation effects”, which may in-
clude—but are not limited to—actions of reciprocity [36], trust [37], and fairness [38].
In line with the definition that we employ [5], trust in game theory can be defined as a belief
about the other’s behavior that creates “the possibility of mutual benefit, if the other person is
cooperative, and the risk of loss to oneself if the other person defects” [39]. Note, however, that
it is possible to observe trust in the absence of reputation [40]. Indeed, one key distinction is
that reputation can be an antecedent of trust (but not necessarily), and trust can in turn be an
antecedent of a diversity of subsequent behaviors [41].
In our model, the audit probability is determined by behavior observed in the previous peri-
od, and the regulator always knows whether the agent is trusted or distrusted. In this sense, the
model may resemble a “reputation-based” strategy. However, there are two reasons why “repu-
tation-based”may not be the appropriate term to describe the regulator’s strategy. First, when
the regulator has incomplete information about the agent’s discount factor, the initial strategy
depends solely on expectations, and does not incorporate information from previous interac-
tions (as these do not exist at this point). Second, past behavior is not observed in a different
game or from previous interactions with different players; it is relevant within the relationship
itself. Trust is derived from repeated interactions over time between the trustor and the trustee
[5, 21, 42], while reputation is often referred to as information available prior to entering a rela-
tionship [31].
With this in mind, we suggest that the regulator’s strategy may be more appropriately de-
scribed as “trust-based”. The model captures the key characteristics of strategies known as
“trust-based” in practice, so at least it already approximates a currently applied conceptualiza-
tion of trust. Additionally, from a lay perspective, lower monitoring is intuitively seen as an in-
dicator of trust, whereas higher monitoring is seen as an indicator of distrust. Moreover, if we
take compliance and enforcement games as a point of reference, the regulator’s vulnerability
increases when he (i) reduces the audit probability without making the penalty more severe,
and (ii) grants a trusted agent the benefit of the doubt. At least with respect to the standard the-
ory in this area, this increased vulnerability is reflective of higher trust [5]. In expectation, the
regulator is not worse off (indeed, trust is not necessarily irrational [43]), but this does not
imply that he is not vulnerable to non-compliance.
The paper is organized as follows. The next sections contain the game description and equi-
librium strategies. Then we analyze the consequences of incorporating uncertainty about the
agent’s intentions, and forgiveness of trust violations. We then discuss the implications of our
results, and present our conclusions.
Game description
The base model
The game has two players, an agent (A) and a regulator (R). The agent can either comply or
not comply with the regulation, while the regulator can either audit the agent or not. The agent
is assumed to choose the level of compliance that maximizes her expected payoffs. She com-
plies with probability α and does not comply with probability 1 − α. Without loss of generality,
the agent’s taxable income is assumed to be equal to 1. If the agent complies, she transfers a
fraction of her income τ to the regulator, where τ 2 (0, 1) represents the tax rate. An agent who
is detected not complying is assumed to pay a penalty, z. When audited, the agent faces costs c.
Given that taxable income is normalized to 1, costs c are assumed to be between 0 and 1 − τ.
Higher costs would mean that the payoff for the agent is negative when she is audited and com-
plies. These costs may include, for instance, hiring professionals to attend the regulator’s in-
spection, or spending time to prepare and attend the audit [11].
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As for the regulator, the cost of conducting an audit is equal to s, s 0. The regulator con-
ducts an audit with probability ρ and no audit with probability 1 − ρ. The regulator is assumed
to maximize its payoffs and therefore does not conduct an audit if the audit costs are larger
than the benefits of detecting an agent not complying, so we assume that s τ + z. Otherwise,
auditing does not represent a credible threat. We also assume that an audit allows the regulator
to observe whether the agent pays the tax.
Note that in this model we ignore the possibility that the tax authority may retrieve informa-
tion regarding compliance from the tax report. Adding this possibility increases complexity,
but the qualitative results continue to hold when the level of reported income yields a signal
about compliance to the tax authority, as long as the authority cannot infer full compliance
with certainty from a reported income level. The model can also be interpreted as deciding
whether or not to investigate compliance with respect to a specific tax reporting issue within
the audit of a firm (e.g., transfer pricing). In this case, the tax report that reflects total taxable
income is unlikely to provide a credible signal on the specific tax reporting issue.
The game is repeated at discrete points in time throughout an infinite time horizon. The
agent and the regulator discount future payoffs by factors δA and δR, respectively, with
δA, δR 2 [0, 1] (for an example of a game in which players have different discount factors,
see [44]).
The strategic form of the game, containing the payoffs for both players per time period, is
presented in Table 1. Note that this is not a zero-sum game because both players face costs as-
sociated with supervision.
Rules that allow trust to develop
The regulator establishes two rules concerning the ways in which trust can be built and dis-
solved. It is assumed that the agent is informed about these rules before the game starts.
Throughout the game, the agent can be trusted, distrusted, or waiting to be either trusted or
distrusted. A waiting agent remains waiting until the regulator conducts an audit. Once an
agent is either trusted or distrusted, she will never be waiting again. The agent is neither trusted
nor distrusted at the beginning of the game, and therefore the agent is assumed to be waiting in
period 0.
Rule 1: Building trust and the consequences of being trusted A waiting agent becomes
trusted if she is audited for the first time and the regulator observes that she is complying. That
is, if the regulator detects a waiting agent complying in period i, then the agent will be trusted
in period i + 1. Trust has two observable consequences.
The first consequence is that, as compared to a distrusted agent, a trusted agent faces a
lower audit probability. More specifically, for any period i 1, a trusted agent faces an audit
probability, ρt, i, which is lower than the audit probability faced by a distrusted agent, ρd, i,
where the subscripts t and d stand for “trusted” and “distrusted”, respectively. The difference
Table 1. Actions and payoffs per time period.
Comply (α) Not comply (1 − α)
Payoff R Payoff A Payoff R Payoff A
Audit (ρ) τ − s 1 − τ − c τ − s + z 1 − τ − c − z
Not audit (1 − ρ) τ 1 − τ 0 1
Variables:
τ: tax, s: costs of auditing, c: costs of being audited, z: penalty for not complying.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117212.t001
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between ρd, i and ρt, i reflects the regulator’s increased level of vulnerability, and may thus be in-
terpreted as an indicator of trust [45]. If it turns out that in equilibrium ρt, i> ρd, i, we conclude
that trust-based regulation is not feasible because assigning a higher audit probability to a
trusted agent contradicts the concept of trust [5].
The second consequence is that a trusted agent is given the benefit of the doubt. This means
that a trusted agent remains trusted when no audit is conducted, just as if compliance had been
confirmed. The two consequences imply that trust is maintained (i.e., the agent continues fac-
ing a lower audit probability) when (i) the regulator audits the trusted agent and the agent is in-
deed complying, or (ii) the regulator does not audit the agent. Note that, in the absence of an
audit, a trusted agent can misuse trust by not complying, and still remain being trusted. Over-
all, this rule implies that the regulator enters a state of increased vulnerability with a trusted
agent. Moreover, this rule approximates the idea that trust is built depending on what is ob-
served through experience and interaction [21, 42].
Rule 2: Dissolving trust and the consequence of being distrusted A waiting or trusted
agent will become distrusted if the regulator conducts an audit and the agent is not complying.
In other words, an agent caught not complying in period i will be distrusted in period i+1.
The consequence of being distrusted is that the agent will remain distrusted from then on (i.
e., the distrusted state is an absorbing state), and thus loses the benefit of facing a lower audit
probability as in the trusted state. This rule captures the idea that a trustor is unwilling to be-
come vulnerable when the trustee’s behavior is evidently negative. To illustrate this point, con-
sider the following principle followed by the tax authorities in the Netherlands: “we trust our
taxpayer unless we have information they cannot be trusted” [46]. We do not incorporate for-
giveness at this point in the game. In the Section Unknown discount factor and forgiveness we
elaborate on the consequences of forgiveness.
Fig. 1 presents the agent’s possible states. The state-dependent strategies of the agent in peri-
od i are denoted αk, i for state k 2 {w, t, d}, i.e., when the agent is waiting, trusted, or distrusted,
respectively. Similarly, the state-dependent strategies of the regulator are denoted ρk, i for state
k 2 {w, t, d}. For notational convenience, however, the dependence on i will often be suppressed
because the strategies are the same for different time periods.
Values and payoffs
In period i, the agent’s value of the game in state k from period i until infinity is denoted VAk, i,
and for the regulator, VRk, i. Taking the above rules into account, we can now present the
Fig 1. The agent’s possible states.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117212.g001
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agent’s and regulator’s expected values for each of the agent’s possible states in period i (as ex-
plained before, we suppress the subscript i).
The agent’s values are:
Distrusted : VAd ¼ 1 adt rd 1 adð Þ tþ zð Þ
rdcþ dAVAd
Trusted : VAt ¼ 1 att rt 1 atð Þ tþ z þ dA VAt  VAdð Þð Þ
rtcþ dAVAt
Waiting : VAw ¼ 1 awt rw 1 awð Þ tþ z þ dA VAt  VAdð Þð Þ
rw cþ dA VAw  VAtð Þð Þ þ dAVAw:
ð1Þ
The regulator’s values are:
Distrusted : VRd ¼ adtþ rd 1 adð Þ tþ zð Þ
rdsþ dRVRd
Trusted : VRt ¼ attþ rt 1 atð Þ tþ z  dR VRt  VRdð Þð Þ
rtsþ dRVRt
Waiting : VRw ¼ awtþ rw 1 awð Þ tþ z  dR VRt  VRdð Þð Þ
rw s dR VRt  VRwð Þð Þ þ dRVRw;
ð2Þ
where αk is the agent’s compliance probability, and ρk is the regulator’s audit probability in
state k 2 {w, t, d}.
Equilibrium strategies
The game is solved by making the regulator indifferent between auditing and not auditing, and
the agent indifferent between complying and not complying. It can be verified from (1) that,
for each state, the regulator makes the agent indifferent with the following strategies:
rd ¼
t
tþ z ð3Þ
rt ¼
t
tþ z þ dA ðVAt  VAdÞ ð4Þ
rw ¼ rt: ð5Þ
For the description of how these strategies are derived, see the proof of Proposition 1 in S1
Appendix.
The intuition is that an agent in the trusted state bears the risk of losing her advantage (i.e.,
a reduction in expected audit costs). When the agent values trust (i.e., when VAt > VAd), the
regulator can lower the audit probability. As the benefits of trust increase, non-compliance is
less attractive, which results in the regulator’s preference for a lower audit probability. Note
that when being trusted is not valuable (i.e., when VAt = VAd), the audit probability is the same
Incorporating Trust into Regulation
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in all states and equal to ρd. When the agent does not value trust (i.e., VAt < VAd), the audit
probability in the trust state is higher than in the distrusted state, which violates the principle of
trust. Furthermore, it is immediately seen that the regulator strategically starts the game by ap-
plying an audit probability ρw equal to the audit probability assigned to a trusted agent, ρt. In
other words, it is optimal for the regulator to start the game with trust. This is possible because
the agent faces the risk of becoming distrusted forever, as she remains in the waiting state until
the first audit takes place.
Similarly, the regulator is indifferent between auditing and not auditing when
ad ¼
tþ z  s
tþ z ¼ 1
s
tþ z ð6Þ
at ¼
tþ z  s dR ðVRt  VRdÞ
tþ z  dR ðVRt  VRdÞ
ð7Þ
aw ¼
tþ z  s dR ðVRw  VRdÞ
tþ z  dR ðVRt  VRdÞ
ð8Þ
Note that the value functions depend on the audit and compliance probabilities, which
yields a system of equations that can be solved to find the optimal strategies in terms of the
model’s parameters. The resulting equilibrium strategies and game values are given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 The following strategies constitute the subgame perfect equilibria for each
period.
A. Traditional (purely) deterrence-based solution
rk ¼
t
tþ z VRk ¼
akt
1 dR
8 k 2 fw; d; tg
ak ¼ 1
s
tþ z VAk ¼
1 t rkc
1 dA
8 k 2 fw; d; tg
B. Trust-based solution(
rd ¼
t
tþ z
rt ¼ rw ¼
tþ z
c
1 dA
dA
VRk ¼
akt
1 dR
8 k 2 fw; d; tg
ak ¼ 1
s
tþ z VAk ¼
1 t rkc
1 dA
8 k 2 fw; d; tg
The trust-based solution satisfies ρd > ρt iff dA > d
? ¼ tþztþzþcrd .
The proof can be found in S1 Appendix. The first solution corresponds to the traditional
(purely) deterrence-based solution, in which the agent is treated equally in all states. Without
trust-based regulation, the game solution is a mixed-strategy in which the strategic agent com-
plies with probability 1 stþz, and the regulator audits with probability ttþz. The compliance
probability decreases with the regulator’s supervision costs s, and increases with the benefits of
detecting non-compliance, τ + z. There is an inverse relationship between the audit probability
and the penalty z, which is the basic principle of deterrence [9]. Because both players are made
Incorporating Trust into Regulation
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0117212 February 23, 2015 9 / 18
indifferent, the regulator’s expected payoff in any period i equals ταi = τ − sρi, whereas the
agent’s expected payoff equals 1 − τ − cρi.
Trust-based regulation yields a second equilibrium, referred to as the trust-based solution. It
shows that, when the agent sufficiently values the future (i.e., when δA> δ
?), there exists an
equilibrium in which the agent enters the trust state based on observed compliance, the audit
probability in the trusted state is lower than in the distrusted state (i.e., ρt< ρd), and the com-
pliance probability in both states is the same. This means that, when δA> δ
?, the regulator’s
trust is notmisused. The intuition is that this compliance level makes the regulator indifferent
between auditing and not auditing so that different audit probabilities result in the same payoff.
When δA < δ
?, the trust-based solution would result in a higher audit probability in the trust
state (i.e, ρt > ρd), as otherwise the regulator’s trust would be misused. In such case, the regula-
tor’s strategy would not reflect the principle of trust. Moreover, this strategy would increase
costs without benefits for either the agent or the regulator. Hence, trust-based regulation is not
incorporated when δA < δ
?.
The probability of auditing a trusted agent, ρt, depends on the extent to which the agent val-
ues future payoffs. More precisely, as δA becomes higher, ρt can be lower because the future
benefits of being trusted are more valuable to the agent. This implies that there is an appropri-
ate level of trust for each agent, so that the level of trust ρd − ρt increases with each agent’s δA.
Being trusted yields an advantage. The audit-related costs for the agent become less as the
expected interaction with the regulator decreases. When these costs (c) approach zero, the
trust-based solution with ρt < ρd is not sustainable, which follows from the fact that δ
? would
be equal to one.
Interestingly, the solution shows that increasing deterrence undermines the feasibility of
trust-based regulation. This can be seen from three different angles. First, the relationship be-
tween audit probability and penalty is opposite in the trusted and distrusted states. Whereas ρd
is decreasing in z, ρt is increasing in z. This means that the introduction of a higher penalty,
which resembles a purely deterrence-based approach, requires a higher (rather than lower)
audit probability in the trusted state. Second, the difference between audit probabilities in the
trusted and distrusted states decreases when z becomes higher. Third, if we substitute ρd in δ
?,
it can be seen that δ? is increasing in z, and as δ? becomes higher, trust-based regulation be-
comes feasible for fewer values of δA. The intuition is that, by increasing the penalty, the regula-
tor reduces the agent’s benefits of being trusted, and therefore the regulator prefers to increase
the audit probability in the trusted state.
Now let us consider the effects on social costs. The trust-based solution yields no benefits to
the regulator in terms of total payoffs. The reduced audit costs are offset by fewer taxes and
penalties received. The regulator is made indifferent between auditing and not auditing and
can thus vary its audit probability without affecting its expected value. However, there is a ben-
efit for the agent. The value in the trusted state is strictly higher than the value in the distrusted
state because the expected costs of being audited are lower. Given that taxes and penalties are
transfers between the players, social costs are equal to expected costs associated with auditing
(for the regulator) and being audited (for the agent), ρi(s + c). As long as the agent enters the
trusted state, social costs decrease by (ρd − ρt)(s + c) for each period in which the agent is
trusted. However, one should note that under the current rules and solution, these benefits dis-
appear in the long run, as soon as the agent enters the absorbing state of being distrusted. In
order to prevent the agent from becoming distrusted forever, the regulator can incorporate for-
giveness. We will elaborate on the effects of forgiveness in the next section.
Finally, let us intuitively elaborate on the effects of incorporating honesty into this model. In
a setting with multiple agents, if a fraction of agents is honest and always complies (as in [30]),
these agents will always remain in the trusted state, and then the distrusted state is no longer an
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absorbing state. Honest agents are never caught not complying, and ρw = ρt implies that all
honest agents are initially trusted. In such case, a trust-based solution rewards and safeguards
honesty, reduces audit costs, and ultimately benefits both agents and the regulator. With hon-
esty, this solution is always preferred over the traditional (purely) deterrence-based solution.
Unknown discount factor and forgiveness
Unknown discount factor δA
The previous section shows that the amount of increased trust depends on the agent’s inten-
tions, which are reflected by δA. Incorporating the regulator’s uncertainty about δA is relevant
because this is likely to be the case in practice, and moreover, this more explicitly captures the
notion of trust, as trust is based on expectations rather than complete certainty about the oth-
er’s intentions [5].
In order to incorporate uncertainty, let us first assume that the agent’s discount factor is
drawn from some distribution function that is common knowledge, the realization of the
agent’s discount factor is not observed by the regulator, and the regulator learns the agent’s dis-
count factor after the first audit.
In line with the concept of trust, the following proposition shows that trust-based regulation
is feasible when the regulator has positive expectations about the agent’s intentions (i.e., when
there is a strictly positive probability that the agent will not violate the regulator’s trust), and if
these expectations are sufficiently high, trust may be initially granted (in the waiting state). Let
us first define α? as the compliance probability obtained in Proposition 1, 1 stþz.
Proposition 2When δA is unknown to the regulator, trust-based regulation is a feasible strat-
egy (ρt ρd) as long as Pr{δA> δ?}> 0.Moreover,
i. when positive expectations are sufficiently high, trust is initially granted, and compliance is
higher than in the game without trust, i.e., if Pr{δA > δ
?}> α?, then E[αw]> α
? and ρw < ρd;
ii. when positive expectations are not sufficiently high, the agent is initially distrusted, and com-
pliance is not affected by trust-based regulation, i.e., if Pr{δA > δ
?} α?, then E[αw] = α? and
ρw = ρd.
The proof can be found in S1 Appendix. The intuition is as follows. The regulator starts the
game by making an assessment of the probability that the agent has positive intentions, Pr{δA
> δ?}. Trust-based regulation is not a feasible strategy when the regulator knows that the agent
intends to misuse trust, Pr{δA > δ
?} = 0. However, when there is even a small probability that
the agent has positive intentions, trust-based regulation can be introduced without reducing
the regulator’s expected payoffs.
Let us start with case i of Proposition 2. Given a ρw < ρd, there exists a critical level of δA, de-
noted ~d, such that the agent has a pure strategy to comply when dA >d
~ (i.e., when the benefits
of honoring trust outweigh the advantages of misusing trust), and a pure strategy not to comply
when dA < ~d (i.e., when, in the short term, the agent benefits from a lower probability of get-
ting caught not complying). Now, if the regulator were to apply ρw = ρd in the waiting state, ex-
pected compliance would, given the optimal response of complying whenever dA < ~d, exceed
α?. It follows that the regulator optimally responds by lowering ρw. The optimal solution can-
not have the (even lower) ρw that would result in compliance equal to α
?, as it follows that the
regulator then maximizes its value by increasing ρw. This leads to αw > α
?.
The resulting audit probability in the waiting state ~r < rd is equal to the audit probability
of a trusted agent with discount factor ~d, and is decreasing in δA. This implies that, if the regu-
lator conducts an audit with probability rw ¼ ~r, and finds that the agent is complying, then
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the regulator under-estimated the agent’s discount factor (i.e., dA  ~d). It can be concluded
that the agent has the intention not to misuse trust, and can thus receive a lower audit probabil-
ity in the trusted state (ρt ρw). Increasing the level of trust, based on previous (positive) inter-
actions, corresponds both to what is observed in practice and the idea that trust can develop
through time [5].
When these positive expectations are not sufficiently high (case ii), the probability that the
agent complies is less than α? for all ρw< ρd, implying that the regulator can only start the game
with ρw = ρd. With this audit probability, an agent with δA< δ
? is indifferent between complying
and not complying, and an agent with δA> δ
? will always prefer to comply. With the rules that
allow trust to develop in place, complying with probability aw ¼ a
?Pr dA>d?f g
Pr dA<d
?f g when δA< δ
? im-
plies that ρw = ρd is indeed the optimal strategy of the regulator. It thus follows that in case ii,
granting initial trust cannot be an equilibrium strategy, although it is possible to build trust over
time if compliance is later confirmed. This result also fits the idea that trust emerges from the re-
lationship itself, and evolves based on what is learned through repeated interactions [5, 21].
To illustrate how trust can develop through time, consider the case of the tax and customs
authorities in the Netherlands, who shape their supervision strategies based on what they learn
from repeated interactions with each firm (these are also known as tailor-made supervision
strategies, [7]).
Forgiveness
Until this section, we have assumed that the distrusted state is an absorbing state. Considering
that amnesty programs and similar instruments are used in practice, in this subsection we ex-
amine the effects of forgiving trust violations. When the regulator observes a distrusted agent
complying, the agent returns to the waiting state with probability u, and remains in the dis-
trusted state with probability 1 − u (as in [2]). Note that u = 0 corresponds to the earlier case
with no forgiveness, and u = 1 implies immediate forgiveness. It can be verified from the for-
mulation of the value functions below that for u = 1 only the traditional (purely) deterrence-
based solution exists. This immediately implies that too much forgiveness will destroy the feasi-
bility of trust-based regulation. The players’ values in the trusted and waiting states are the
same as in (1) and (2). The values in the distrusted state are however different:
VRd ¼ adtþ rd 1 adð Þ tþ zð Þ
rd s adudR VRt  VRdð Þð Þ þ dRVRd
VAd ¼ 1 adt rd 1 adð Þ tþ zð Þ
rd c adudA VAt  VAdð Þð Þ þ dAVAd:
ð9Þ
Making the agent and the regulator indifferent in each of the states yields the following
strategies in terms of value functions:
rd ¼
t
tþ z þ dAuðVAw  VAdÞ
ad ¼
tþ z  s
tþ z  dRuðVRw  VRdÞ
rt ¼
t
tþ z þ dAðVAt  VAdÞ
at ¼
tþ z  s dRðVRt  VRdÞ
tþ z  dRðVRt  VRdÞ
rw ¼ rt aw ¼
tþ z  s dRðVRw  VRdÞ
tþ z  dRðVRt  VRdÞ
ð10Þ
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The solution to this system of equations yields the equilibrium strategies as given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 For each period of the game with forgiveness, the following strategies constitute
the subgame perfect equilibria.
A. Traditional (purely) deterrence-based solution
rk ¼
t
tþ z for all k 2 fw; d; tg
ak ¼ 1
s
tþ z for all k 2 fw; d; tg
B. Trust-based solution(
rt ¼ rw ¼
1
2cdAð1 uÞ
F þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
F2 þ 4cdAð1 uÞtuð1 dAÞ
ph i
rd ¼
tþ rtc
tþ z þ cþ
ð1 dAÞ½1 rtðtþ zÞ
dArtðtþ z þ cÞ
ak ¼ 1
s
tþ z for all k 2 fw; d; tg
where F = τuδA + (τ + z)(1 − δA)(1 − u).
For δA> δ
?, as given in Proposition 1, there exists a u? 2 (0, 1) so that the trust-based solution
satisfies ρd > ρt iff u< u
?, where u? ¼ ctdAð1dAÞðtþzÞ2dAtðcþtþzÞ .
This proposition shows that when trust-based regulation is feasible (δA> δ
?), forgiveness
can also be included, as long as the regulator is not too forgiving. This has an effect on the audit
probabilities both in the trusted and distrusted states. The possibility of being forgiven and re-
ceiving the benefits of trust increases the value in the distrusted state, and for this reason, the
regulator can even reduce the audit probability in the distrusted state, although this would be a
modest reduction. So compared to the game without trust, the audit probability in this game is
reduced in both the trusted and distrusted states without affecting compliance.
With forgiveness (u> 0), the distrusted state is no longer an absorbing state. Taking the
trusted and waiting states together (which are treated equally by the regulator), and writing the
transitions as a Markov chain shows that the probability that—in the long run—an agent is in
the trusted state,Pt, is equal to
Pt ¼
rduad
rduad þ rt ð1 adÞ
> 0:
This implies that the reduced costs of auditing and being audited in the trusted state are re-
alized not only in the short, but also in the long run.
Let us now illustrate this equilibrium and its long term effects with a numerical example.
Example 1 Let τ = 0.35, z = 0.15, and c = 0.025. It follows from these parameter values that
δ? = 0.966. Therefore, if δA > 0.966, trust-based regulation is a feasible solution in the absence of
forgiveness. To illustrate the effect of forgiveness, let us assume that δA = 0.99. Fig. 2 presents the
equilibrium audit strategies.
For these parameter values, the traditional deterrence-based solution has an audit probability
equal to ttþz ¼ 0:7. In the absence of forgiveness, the audit probability in the trusted state (ρt) is
0.2 (see Proposition 1). Forgiveness (i.e., u> 0)makes ρt increase, and the trust-based solution is
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feasible with ρt < ρd as long as forgiveness u is less than u
? = 0.0334. In a setting with multiple
agents, this implies that at most 3.34% of distrusted agents who are found complying can be for-
given. The minimum audit probability in the distrusted state is obtained with forgiveness u =
0.012, which yields ρd = 0.6929.
Let the cost of auditing be s = 0.25, which yields α = 0.5. For this value and for u = 0.012,Pt =
0.0216, which means that the percentage of trusted agents in the long run is 2.16%. The audit
probabilities are ρt = 0.377 and ρd = 0.693. In the traditional solution, the expected social costs
per period (i.e., the total costs of auditing and being audited) are equal to 0.193, and in the trust-
based solution they are equal to 0.189, implying a cost reduction in the long run of 2.00%. In the
short run, the cost reduction is 53.80%.
Let us finally consider the effect of improved efficiency. When the cost of auditing s is assumed
to be only 0.1, compliance increases, and more agents end up being trusted in the long run (Pt =
0.0811), which yields a social cost reduction of 4.69% in the long run.
Two key points can be taken from this example. First, as expected, forgiveness reduces the
amount of trust that trusted agents receive: the difference between ρd and ρt becomes smaller.
Second, as compared to the traditional deterrence-based game, trust-based regulation with a
low level of forgiveness allows the regulator to reduce the audit probability, independently of
the state in which the agent is, without affecting compliance.
Implications
These results have five important implications, which might be relevant to the policy-maker.
Implication 1: Trust-based regulation can reduce social costs. A feasible trust-based regula-
tion strategy allows the regulator to reduce the audit probability in the trusted state, and with
low levels of forgiveness, reduce the audit probability in all states (trusted and distrusted). Be-
cause audits are costly for both players, this strategy reduces social costs.
Implication 2: Trust-based regulation is not always possible. Some may promote the uncon-
ditional incorporation of trust into regulatory practice. However, we show that trust is misused
when the cost of being audited is very small or when the agent is short-term oriented. The
model shows that a naive strategy based on “blind trust” is not recommendable, as having posi-
tive expectations is required.
Implication 3: The level of trust is determined by each individual relationship. A reduction in
the audit probability depends on the regulator’s expectations or actual knowledge about the
Fig 2. Numerical example.Optimal audit probabilities ρd and ρt as a function of forgiveness u, for τ = 0.35, z = 0.15, δ = 0.99 and c = 0.025. Panel A: ρd, ρt
as a function of u Panel B: ρd on smaller scale
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117212.g002
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agent’s discount factor. In practice, the regulator may decide the extent to which each agent is
trusted, depending on what it learns about each agent. This reflects a system of “tailor-made”
strategies, in which trust may develop on a selective case-by-case basis.
Implication 4: Increasing deterrence undermines trust. The model shows that higher penal-
ties make trust-based regulation less feasible. This goes in line with the idea that trust and de-
terrence can not go hand in hand.
Implication 5: Positive expectations suffice. When the regulator is uncertain about the agent’s
intentions, but nevertheless has positive expectations about her intentions, trust-based regula-
tion does not reduce the regulator’s payoffs, and may even increase compliance.
Before concluding, let us mention that these results may apply to not only a tax setting but
also other regulatory settings. Consider a general case in which the agent decides whether to
pay a compliance cost k, yielding a benefit to the regulator equal to b. This benefit may be either
political or driven by a direct economic transfer. The payoffs in each period for this model are
given in Table 2.
For this model, the optimal strategies are equal to the strategies derived in Propositions 1
and 3, with τ replaced by b in the strategy of A, and by k in the strategy of R. Note that each
player’s strategy is a function of the other player’s parameters, as each strategy is derived to
make the other player indifferent.
Conclusion
In this paper, the regulator has the option to incorporate a trust-based strategy in which com-
pliance is rewarded with a lower audit probability. Prior research indicates that reducing the
audit probability (the carrot) must be compensated with the introduction of harsher penalties
for non-compliance (the stick [1, 2]). The model in this paper shows that introducing the car-
rot without the stick is a feasible strategy when the agent sufficiently values the future.
By focusing on a non-cooperative game, we are able to examine whether a trust-based strat-
egy is feasible even in the most severe case (i.e., without coalitions, cooperative commitments,
or other-regarding preferences). The direct implication is that a feasible trust-based strategy
will ultimately respond to self-interest (for both players).
A question that may arise is whether such strategy can respond to a selfish motive and at the
same time approximate the concept of trust. To answer this, consider the following three possi-
bilities. By introducing a new type of regulation, the regulator’s expected payoffs can decrease,
increase, or remain the same. If trust-based regulation were to reduce the regulator’s payoffs,
introducing this type of regulation would be—from an economic perspective—irrational, and
the analysis would lie beyond the scope and theory of this paper. Conversely, if trust-based
Table 2. Actions and payoffs per time period for a general model.
Comply (α) Not comply (1 − α)
Payoff R Payoff A Payoff R Payoff A
Audit (ρ) b − s −k − c b − s + z −k − c − z
Not audit (1 − ρ) b −k 0 0
Variables:
b: regulator’s beneﬁt derived from compliance, k: cost of complying, s: costs of auditing, c: costs of being
audited, z: penalty for not complying.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117212.t002
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regulation were to increase the regulator’s payoffs, it would be more indicative of an exclusively
profit-maximizing strategy. Only when the regulator is indifferent about introducing trust-
based regulation, this strategy takes the furthest distance from a purely profit-maximizing
strategy without violating the principle of rationality. Because trust-based regulation has the
potential to only benefit the agent, without ever reducing the expected payoffs of any player,
the regulator’s indifference best reflects a positive disposition towards the agent—as much as it
is possible in a non-cooperative game.
More generally, it may be argued that this “trust-based” strategy does not capture the notion
of trust but rather a system of incentives in which the regulator maximizes payoffs [47]. Note,
however, that incorporating trust may be based on both calculative and non-calculative mo-
tives, so the calculativeness nature of a trust-based strategy does not necessarily rule out the ex-
istence of trust [43].
Another question is whether it is possible to introduce trust without a certain degree of reci-
procity. Reciprocity can be defined as decisions based on “other-regarding preferences that are
conditional on the perceived intentions behind the actions of others” [39]. Although expecta-
tions about reciprocity may facilitate the emergence of trust, trust can exist in the absence of
reciprocity [48]. In our model, trust is based on the expectation that the agent will not comply
less when the audit probability is lower. In other words, positive expectations do not refer to
other-regarding preferences that ultimately benefit the regulator (e.g., higher compliance as a
response to positive reciprocity). Instead, positive expectations refer to self-regarding behavior
that does not harm the regulator. From a mathematical perspective, positive expectations in
this model refer to actions that lead to non-negative outcomes. Reciprocity may further in-
crease the benefits of trust-based regulation [17]. Explicitly incorporating the effects of reci-
procity may be an interesting extension for future research.
Recently, experimental researchers have examined the effects of conditional audit strategies
on compliance behavior [49, 50]. New experiments may test this model’s predictions by exam-
ining, for example, whether a reduction in the audit probability affects compliance, while con-
trolling for long-term orientation. The second direction relates to the model that we employ,
which has the same limitations as the generic game theoretical model of tax compliance [11].
For instance, one limitation is that behavior is dichotomous (i.e., the agent either fully pays
taxes or pays nothing at all). Future models of trust-based regulation may incorporate more
complex extensions, such as under-reporting, moral behavior, or social stigma, as compliance
can be explained by economic and non-economic factors [28].
Supporting Information
S1 Appendix. Proofs.
(PDF)
Acknowledgments
We thank two anonymous reviewers, Anja De Waegenaere, Richard Sansing, Henri C. Dekker,
Erich Kirchler, Michael Bromwich, Joshua Ronen, the participants of the EIASM 5th Interna-
tional Workshop on Accounting and Regulation, and the participants of the seminars at VU
University Amsterdam for useful comments on earlier drafts.
Author Contributions
Wrote the paper: JPM JLW.
Incorporating Trust into Regulation
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0117212 February 23, 2015 16 / 18
References
1. Greenberg J (1984) Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 32: 1–13. doi: 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1
2. HarringtonW (1988) Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal of Public Economics
37: 29–53. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(88)90003-5
3. Friesen L (2003) Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 46: 72–85. doi: 10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00033-5
4. Lange B, Gouldson A (2010) Trust-based environmental regulation. Science of the Total Environment
408: 5235–5243. doi: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2010.07.052 PMID: 20797772
5. Rousseau DM, Sitkin SB, Burt RS, Camerer C (1998) Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view
of trust. Academy of Management Review 23: 393–404. doi: 10.5465/AMR.1998.926617
6. OECD (2013) Co-operative compliance: A framework. OECD Publishing.
7. xBelastingdienst (2008). Dutch tax and customs administration business plan 2008–2012. URL http://
www.belastingdienst.nl/. Accessed: 2012-02-01.
8. OEM (2009) Debureaucratisation plan for business regulation. The Danish Ministry of Economic and
Business Affairs.
9. Becker GS (1968) Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76:
169–217. doi: 10.1086/259394
10. Graetz MJ, Reinganum JF, Wilde LL (1986) The tax compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of
law enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 2: 1–32.
11. Andreoni J, Erard B, Feinstein J (1998) Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature 36: 818–860.
12. Shavell S, Polinsky AM (2000) The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of Economic
Literature 38: 45–76. doi: 10.1257/jel.38.1.45
13. Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1986) The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete
information. Econometrica 54: 533–554. doi: 10.2307/1911307
14. Landsberger M, Meilijson I (1982) Incentive generating state dependent penalty system: The case of in-
come tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics 19: 333–352. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(82)90060-3
15. Raymond M (1999) Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted: A reconsideration under
asymmetric information. Journal of Public Economics 73: 289–295. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)
00106-6
16. Cherney A (1997) Trust as regulatory strategy: A theoretical review. Current Issues in Criminal Justice
9: 71.
17. Feld LP, Frey BS (2002) Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated. Economics of Governance 3:
87–99. doi: 10.1007/s101010100032
18. Mayer RC, Davis JH, Schoorman FD (1995) An integrative model of organizational trust. Academy of
Management Review 20: 709–734. doi: 10.2307/258792
19. Kramer RM (1999) Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions. An-
nual Review of Psychology 50: 569–598. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.50.1.569 PMID: 15012464
20. Lewicki RJ, Tomlinson EC, Gillespie N (2006) Models of interpersonal trust development: Theoretical
approaches, empirical evidence, and future directions. Journal of Management 32: 991–1022. doi: 10.
1177/0149206306294405
21. Chang LJ, Doll BB, vanWout M, Frank MJ, Sanfey AG (2010) Seeing is believing: Trustworthiness as a
dynamic belief. Cognitive Psychology 61: 87–105. doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.03.001 PMID:
20553763
22. AllinghamMG, Sandmo A (1972) Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Econom-
ics 1: 323–338. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2
23. Srinivasan TN (1973) Tax evasion: A model. Journal of Public Economics 2: 339–346. doi: 10.1016/
0047-2727(73)90024-8
24. Sandmo A (2005) The theory of tax evasion: A retrospective view. National Tax Journal 58: 643–663.
25. Sansing RC (1993) Information acquisition in a tax compliance game. The Accounting Review 68:
874–884.
26. Bernasconi M (1998) Tax evasion and orders of risk aversion. Journal of Public Economics 67: 123–
134. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00051-0
27. Crocker KJ, Slemrod J (2005) Corporate tax evasion with agency costs. Journal of Public Economics
89: 1593–1610. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.003
28. Kirchler E (2007) The economic psychology of tax behaviour. Cambridge University Press.
Incorporating Trust into Regulation
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0117212 February 23, 2015 17 / 18
29. Fudenberg D, Levine D, Maskin E (1994) The folk theorem with imperfect public information. Econome-
trica 62: 997–1039. doi: 10.2307/2951505
30. Erard B, Feinstein JS (1994) Honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game. The RAND Journal of
Economics 25: 1–19. doi: 10.2307/2555850
31. Kreps DM (1995) Corporate culture and economic theory. In: Alt JE, Shepsle KA, editors, Perspectives
on positive political economy, New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 90–143.
32. Weigelt K, Camerer C (1988) Reputation and corporate strategy: A review of recent theory and applica-
tions. Strategic Management Journal 9: 443–454. doi: 10.1002/smj.4250090505
33. Kreps DM, Wilson R (1982) Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27:
253–279. doi: 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8
34. Camerer C, Weigelt K (1988) Experimental tests of a sequential equilibrium reputation model. Econo-
metrica 56: 1–36. doi: 10.2307/1911840
35. Sigmund K, Hauert C, Nowak MA (2001) Reward and punishment. Proceedings of the National Acade-
my of Sciences 98: 10757–10762. doi: 10.1073/pnas.161155698
36. Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck HJ (2002) Reputation helps solve the tragedy of the commons. Na-
ture 415: 424–426. doi: 10.1038/415424a PMID: 11807552
37. King-Casas B, Tomlin D, Anen C, Camerer CF, Quartz SR, et al. (2005) Getting to know you: Reputa-
tion and trust in a two-person economic exchange. Science 308: 78–83. doi: 10.1126/science.
1108062 PMID: 15802598
38. Nowak MA, Page KM, Sigmund K (2000) Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game. Science 289:
1773–1775. doi: 10.1126/science.289.5485.1773 PMID: 10976075
39. Cox JC (2004) How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 46: 260–281. doi:
10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00119-2
40. Berg J, Dickhaut J, McCabe K (1995) Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Be-
havior 10: 122–142. doi: 10.1006/game.1995.1027
41. Ostrom E (2003) Toward a behavioral theory linking trust, reciprocity, and reputation. In: Ostrom E,
Walker J, editors, Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons for experimental research, New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
42. Zaheer A, McEvily B, Perrone V (1998) Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of interorganizational
and interpersonal trust on performance. Organization Science 9: 141–159. doi: 10.1287/orsc.9.2.141
43. Craswell R (1993) On the uses of trust: Comment onWilliamson, calculativeness, trust, and economic
organization. Journal of Law & Economics 36: 487–500. doi: 10.1086/467285
44. Radner R (1985) Repeated principal-agent games with discounting. Econometrica 53: 1173–1198.
doi: 10.2307/1911017
45. Schoorman FD, Mayer RC, Davis JH (2007) An integrative model of organizational trust: Past, present,
and future. Academy of Management Review 32: 344–354. doi: 10.5465/AMR.2007.24348410
46. OECD (2009) Forum on Tax Administration: Compliance management of large business task group.
OECD Publishing.
47. Williamson OE (1993) Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. Journal of Law & Economics
36: 453–486. doi: 10.1086/467284
48. Castelfranchi C (2008) Trust and reciprocity: misunderstandings. International Review of Economics
55: 45–63. doi: 10.1007/s12232-008-0041-x
49. Alm J, McKee M (2004) Tax compliance as a coordination game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Or-
ganization 54: 297–312. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.02.003
50. Clark J, Friesen L, Muller A (2007) The good, the bad, and the regulator: An experimental test of two
conditional audit schemes. Economic Inquiry 42: 69–87. doi: 10.1093/ei/cbh045
Incorporating Trust into Regulation
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0117212 February 23, 2015 18 / 18
